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Evaluating Norms: An Empirical
Analysis of the Relationship between
Norm-Content, Operator, and
Charitable Behavior
Brian Sheppard
63 Vand. L. Rev. 55 (2010)
Fiery Cushman
There are several kinds of norms, and this variety can lead to
spirited debate about the best norm to employ for the regulationof a
particularactivity. Should the norm be mandatory or aspirational?
A rule or a standard?One important area in which norm-choice has
come to the fore is the American Bar Association's oversight of pro
bono work. Currently, the organization utilizes an aspirational
norm recommending that lawyers perform at least fifty pro bono
hours annually, but there is pressure to adopt some sort of
mandatory rubric. Inspired by this debate, we have designed and
implemented an experiment that provides some insight into the
effective design of norms for charitablegiving. Our results challenge
the conventional wisdom that the implementation of a mandatory
framework will result in an overall increase in giving. These
findings may be applicable not only to the pro bono debate but also
to general legislative strategy with respect to inducement of
charitablebehavior.
Prior empirical studies that have analyzed the effect of norm
characteristics on behavior have typically pitted rules against
standards. We placed these two norm-content classes in combination
with two kinds of operators: aspirationaland mandatory. Thus, we
tested four norm combinations, each one representative of norms in
important rubrics such as legal systems and codes of ethics.
Through this more complex model, our results contribute to the
literature on two psychological phenomena, motivation crowding
and anchoring, that affect the way people respond to norms.
We found that, in the context of inducing charitable behavior,
it is more effective to use an aspirationalrather than a mandatory
operator when the operator is conjoined with moral norm-content.
Additionally, we found that the effectiveness of norms that utilize
mandatory operators is contingent upon the kind of norm-content

that they employ, whether moral or bright-line, and that this is not
true with norms utilizing aspirationaloperators. Lastly, the deficit
in effectiveness that arises from using mandatory operators in
conjunction with moral norm-content can be overcome by switching
to bright-line norm-content, but only if the minimums are set very
high. Our results support the view that norms can induce crowding
out, leading to less charitable conduct than would have occurred
under an aspirational system. They also illustrate a context in
which aspirationalnorms are resistantto anchoring effects.
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Imagine that you are trying to prevent a child from stealing
cookies. Should you tell the child, "It's wrong to steal-good children
don't do that!"? Or, "One more cookie and there's no TV for a month!"?
Which of these directives or, more broadly, norms, will be best at
keeping the kid's fingers out of the jar? It is not an easy question to
answer, but the implications of that answer are important.
The design of effective norms is a critical task for all
legislators, whether the concern is cookie conservation or nuclear
proliferation. A legislator must try to determine which norm will bring
about the best results. Here, we are most concerned with the question
of how to maximize total charitable giving. Our inspiration was the
energetic debate concerning the best way to increase pro bono work by
American lawyers.' Those engaging the question largely agree that
norms can serve as an effective tool for increasing pro bono work, but
there remains disagreement about which type of norm is best.
Consequently, we explored the design of effective norms from several
complementary angles: historical analysis, conceptual analysis, the
analysis of relevant psychological research, and our own empirical
testing. By integrating empirical research we hope not only to
contribute to the broader literature on designing effective norms, but
also to present a case study that will be valuable to those who seek to
increase charitable behavior among lawyers. We also hope that our
study will serve as a useful basic model for further experimentation by
legal scholars.
This Article specifically focuses on two dimensions of norms:
first, the use of bright-line rules versus moral standards and, second,
the use of aspirational versus mandatory operators.
1.

See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC

SERVICE AND THE PROFESSIONS 37 (2005) (discussing objections to mandatory pro bono service);
Samuel Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro Bono and PrivateAttorneys General, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1459
(2007) (responding to the proponents of mandatory pro bono service and discussing its costs);
Donald Patrick Harris, Let's Make Lawyers Happy: Advocating Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 N. ILL.
U. L. REV. 287, 287-89 (1999) (discussing the debate regarding mandatory pro bono and
advocating its adoption); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tending to the Generous Heart: Mandatory Pro
Bono and Moral Development, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 475-79 (2001) (discussing research
results on motivation); Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers' Pro Bono
Responsibilities:From Chance Noblesse Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 91, 155-61
(2002) (proposing a requirement for annual pro bono service reporting).
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Rules set forth specific, concrete directives such as "appellants
must file their briefs within eighteen days." It is common that a rule
will employ numerical minimums or maximums, and in such cases the
norm is said to set forth a "bright-line." Standards, by contrast, set
forth evaluative, discretionary directives such as, "Users must take
reasonable precautions." We shall refer to rules and standards as two
alternative types of norm-content.
The second dimension we explore is the choice of norm
operator. Consider the difference between, "You ought not to eat
cookies," and, "You must not eat cookies." The content of the desired
action (not eating cookies) is identical in both cases, but the type of
norm varies. The use of "ought" indicates an aspirational standard
suggested as an ideal. The use of "must," by contrast, indicates a
mandatory demand. As we will discuss below, mandatory norms are
often accompanied by the stipulation of punishments (e.g., "If you eat
cookies, there will be coal your stocking.").
Whether we know it from trial and error or common sense,
certain operator/norm-content combinations seem more appropriate in
particular contexts. The penal code, for example, often uses
mandatory rules to criminalize conduct that is both socially
undesirable and easily defined, such as the possession of a controlled
substance. 2 Other times, strict enforcement is still required, but
delineating the undesirable conduct is difficult. Such circumstances
often give rise to mandatory standards, as opposed to rules-for
instance, the "reasonable person" standard of care required for
negligent homicide. 3 In contrast to legal institutions, private
organizations often employ aspirational norm-content, perhaps due to
the difficulty in executing enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms.
For example, churches sometimes have clearly defined aspirational
rules for charitable giving, such as the traditional 10 percent tithe. Or,
a private club's dress code might rely on an aspirational standard like
"members should dress appropriately."
Our intuitions about the fit between a norm combination and a
context can be very strong indeed. One danger of relying on intuition,
2.
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) (2006) ("In the case of less than 50 kilograms of
marihuana, except in the case of 50 or more marihuana plants regardless of weight, 10 kilograms
of hashish, or one kilogram of hashish oil or in the case of any controlled substance in schedule
III (other than gamma hydroxybutyric acid), or 30 milligrams of flunitrazepam, such person
shall, except as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not more than 5 years .... .").
3.
See, e.g., Wakefield v. State, 447 So. 2d 1325, 1326 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) ("[Criminally
negligent homicide] involves inadvertent risk creation coupled with the actor's failure to perceive
[the risk] which 'constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would observe in the situation.' ").
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however, is that seemingly fitting norms can bring about surprising
and undesirable behavioral results.4 In fact, as we review below, there
is a psychological literature suggesting counterintuitive relationships
between norm and behavior. This Article draws from the existing
research on competing norm types and also contributes to that
literature a new study of norm compliance among students of Harvard
Law School.
In Section I, we consider conventional wisdom about norms
through the lens of a historical case of shifting norm types: the
standards of professional responsibility developed by the American
Bar Association ("ABA"). We also consider empirical studies that
challenge the deterrence hypothesis. In Section II, we examine the
character of rules versus standards and aspirational versus
mandatory operators in greater detail. In Section III, we present our
research design and offer general hypotheses. In Section IV, we
discuss additional methodological details that may be of interest to a
legal readership. In Section V, we present our experimental results.
Finally, in Section VI, we address the policy implications of our work.
I. NORMS: CONVENTIONAL ASSUMPTIONS AND EXPERIMENTAL
CHALLENGES
Although there is occasionally debate about which combination
of norm-operator and norm-content would be best for regulating a

particular conduct, sanction-backed, mandatory rules are often
presumed to be the best. Such norms benefit from the conventional
wisdom that people are more inclined to behave the way you want
them to when you tell them exactly what they have to do while

threatening

them

with

punishment

for

noncompliance.

This

assumption has been called the "deterrence hypothesis."5 Put
differently, the idea is that the introduction of a sanction-backed,
specific mandate will produce a reduction of the undesirable behavior.
4.
There are other dangers as well. For example, with respect to the choice between rules
and standards, economists have set forth frameworks to guide legislators in making the optimal
decision. These frameworks call for far more than mere reliance on a hunch. Even the most
streamlined model requires that legislators make several careful inquires, such as weighing the
cost of promulgating a rule against the cost of judicial enforcement multiplied by the expected
number of accidents, the latter of which calls for evaluation of the number of parties affected, the
care they will take in light of the cost of available precautions, the chance of accident, and the
expected harm from accident. See Eric A. Posner, Standards,Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 101-02 (1997) (discussing Louis Kaplow's model in Rules Versus
Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 624-29 (1992)).
See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2000)
5.
("Mhe deterrence hypothesis is based on the assumption that the introduction of a penalty will
produce a reduction of the behavior.").
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A paradigmatic instance of this conventional wisdom in action
is the history of American lawyer conduct regulation. The ABA has
been the most important drafter of American lawyer conduct rules for
the last one hundred years. During that span, its codes of ethics have
smoothly shifted away from aspirational, moral, and unenforced
standards of conduct and toward bright-line mandatory rules that are
enforced with the threat of punishment. The first code, the 1908
Canons of Ethics, largely utilized aspirational norm operators and
moral standard norm-content. In particular, the code's provisions used
hortatory language that was not apt for enforcement-such as
"should" 6 or "ought,"7 as opposed to mandatory language like "must" or
"forbids." The Canons made their aspirational nature clearest where
they stated, "[T]he following canons of ethics are adopted by the
American Bar Association as a general guide." They also made ample
use of moral standard norm-content, incorporating standards of
"fairness"8 and even "moral law."
The Canons and their aspirational/moral norm combinations
lasted nearly unchanged for several decades. However, in 1970 the
ABA passed the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which
introduced bright-line rules called "Disciplinary Rules." These "Rules"
represented a new tactic for regulating lawyer conduct: they
functioned as ready enforcement mechanisms because they clearly
established minimum compulsory conduct. Moreover, they threatened
more than professional reputational harm; instead, the "Rules" were
an obvious trigger for court-imposed penalties.10
The old Canons were abandoned in large part because they
"failed to give guidance to young lawyers beyond the language of the

6.
See, e.g., CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, Canon 22 (1908) ('The conduct of the lawyer before
the Court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness.").
7.
See, e.g., id. Canon 16 ("A lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent
his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with
reference to their conduct towards Courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a
client persists in such wrong-doing the lawyer should terminate their relation."); id. Canon 4 (A
lawyer "ought not to ask to be excused for any trivial reason.").
See, e.g., id. Canon 18 ("A lawyer should always treat adverse witnesses and suitors
8.
with fairness and due consideration, and he should never minister to the malevolence or
prejudices of a client in the trial or conduct of a cause.").
9.
See, e.g., id. Canon 32 ("Correspondingly, he advances the honor of his profession and
the best interests of his client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon
the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law.").
10. "Thus, whereas the Canons and the Ethical Considerations represented fraternal
understandings that memorialized a shared group discourse, the [Disciplinary Rules] functioned
as a statute defining the legal contours of a vocation whose practitioners were connected
primarily by having been licensed to practice law." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal
Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1251 (1991).
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Canons themselves" and, relatedly, because "[t]hey were not cast in
language designed for disciplinary enforcement[,] and many abounded
with quaint expressions of the past."" The aspirational/moral norms
therein could not be expected to "facilitate more effective disciplinary
action and .. . increase significantly the level of voluntary
compliance."12 This conclusion must have been based on sheer common
sense and conventional wisdom, as there is no indication that
empirical research was performed on the issue of whether
mandatory/bright-line
norms would bring about
increased
compliance.13 Since then, little research has been done.14
Although the Model Code did not entirely dispense with the
aspirational moral guidelines-it included, for instance, a broad
outline of the profession's ethical aims designated as "Ethical
Considerations"-the last vestiges of the Canons would soon be nearly
undetectable. The movement that led to the introduction of
Disciplinary Rules would gain momentum. Only thirteen years later,
the ABA issued an even more rule-based standard of conduct, The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which, among other things,
placed greater emphasis on the sanction-backed rules and replaced
the "Ethical Considerations" with "Comments." Notably, these
Comments bore even less of a resemblance to the Canons than did the
"Ethical Considerations"; they operated primarily as commentary or
background information for the "Rules" and did not set forth the
profession's ideals. Today, the mandatory, rule-based format

11. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1983).
12. Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., A Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 1063, 1069 (1978)
(quoting ABA President Lewis Powell's 1965 address).
13. Interview by Olavi Maru with John F. Sutton, Jr. in Houston, Tex. (Dec. 20, 1976)
(transcript on file with the American Bar Foundation Program on Oral History) ("It appeared
that they felt they were between the devil and the deep blue sea: they wanted to do something
significant in rethinking the entire area of lawyers' ethics without being bogged down in
expensive empirical research. That kind of thinking led them to decide that they needed
someone, who had both the professional viewpoint and the practitioner's viewpoint, to devote
substantial time to the project. They wanted a code that would work as a teaching instrument
and that also would be practical as a basis of discipline for the practicing lawyer. They realized, I
think, that the old canons did not serve either purpose very well.").

14. See, e.g., Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1273, 1334 (1998) ("While there is little in-depth empirical work
on compliance counseling, a handful of qualitative studies have provided detailed accounts of the
ways in which lawyers' professional ideals play out in practice."); W. Bradley Wendel, Public
Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 17 (1999) ("Very little
empirical work has been done on the moral decision making of lawyers . . . ."); cf. Fred. C.
Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 406 (1994) (calling for extensive
empirical research to be done for betterment of professional responsibility codes).
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prevails. 15 Unsurprisingly, some have called the widespread adoption
of mandatory, sanction-backed, bright-line norms the "legalization" of
lawyer conduct regulation.1 6
It is particularly noteworthy, then, that an important area of
lawyer conduct has been somewhat immune to this legalization trend:
pro bono work. The latest iteration of the Model Rules contains Model
Rule 6.1, which merely directs that every lawyer "should aspire to
render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year."1 7
This aspirational/bright-line norm is a bit old fashioned by today's
standards. Yet even Model Rule 6.1 has drifted toward legalization,
just at a slower pace. Originally, it contained no bright-line normcontent, 18 but a 1993 amendment introduced the fifty-hour
aspirational minimum. 19

15. To be sure, this picture of a smooth, unidirectional shift is a bit oversimplified: many
among those who drafted the 1908 CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS expressed their desire that the
CANONS be utilized as standards for punishment. See Memorandum by the ABA Comm. to Draft
Canons of Prof'l Ethics (Mar. 23, 1908) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (compiling
the responses to the Committee's proposed Canons). And since the 1980s, there have been
attempts in various bars to incorporate aspirational and sometimes unenforceable lawyer creeds
into lawyer regulation. Many point to an address given by Chief Justice Burger in 1984 as an
impetus for the recent dialectical movement to return to aspirational norms. See Chief Justice
Warren Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary to the ABA (Feb. 13, 1984), in 52
U.S.L.W. 2471, 2471 (1984) (decrying minimum standards). Even so, it cannot be ignored that
there has, in the heartland of lawyer regulation, been a clear shift from aspiration to mandate
and from moral to bright-line criteria.
16. See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Education Law: What Should Law School Student
Conduct Codes Do?, 38 AKRON L. REV. 803 (2005) (discussing the regulatory nature of the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility); Colin Croft, Reconceptualizing American Legal
Professionalism:A Proposal for Deliberative Moral Community, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1256, 1311
(1992) ("The change to legalization and rule-domination of legal professional norms - first, and
most pointedly with the shift from the Canons to the Model Code, and then from Model Code to
the Model Rules - indicates a willingness to abandon the idea of expanding legal professional
standards beyond a minimum standard of conduct."); Hazard, supra note 10, at 1249 ("What
were fraternal norms issuing from an autonomous professional society have now been
transformed into a body of judicially enforced regulations."); Trina Jones, Inadvertent Disclosure
of Privileged Information and the Law of Mistake, 48 EMORY L.J. 1255, 1291 n.90 (1999) ("In an
attempt to establish more extensive control over the profession, in 1970 the ABA adopted the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility and with it the process of legalizing and codifying
professional norms began with a vengeance."); Charles Wolfram, Toward a History of the
Legalization of American Legal Ethics-II the Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 206
(2002) ("The grounds for discipline have been elaborated upon and extended in lawyer codes that
are now explicitly designed for all-encompassing and coercive regulation . . . ."); Fred C.
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 27
n.162 (2005) ("The conceptualization of the professional regulation of lawyers as forming part of
a larger 'law governing lawyers' is a relatively modern phenomenon.").
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2002).
18. Id. R. 6.1 (1983) ("A lawyer should render public interest legal service.").
19. Id. R. 6.1 (1993) ("A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono
publico legal services per year.").
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Now, it appears that Model Rule 6.1 could become entirely
legalized. There is active debate about whether mandatory/bright-line
norms ought to be employed in order to prompt lawyers to provide
more annual hours of pro bono work. 20 Some law schools, taking a first
step toward mandatory service, have conditioned graduation upon the
completion of a minimum number of pro bono hours. 21
Pro bono work is an important public service, so the decision to
change or maintain the prevailing rubric should be as informed as
possible; reliance on the conventional wisdom of the deterrence
hypothesis is not enough. We hope that our empirical research will
provide valuable insights for this debate.
Previous work in this vein has pitted rules against standards. 22
It has given rise to a lively discussion about the relative costs and
benefits of bright-line and evaluative norm-content. That work is
20. See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct:
Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 474 & n.58 (2002)
(discussing ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission debate over whether mandatory pro bono service
requirements ought to be utilized) ("In considering whether to make pro bono mandatory, the
Commission was concerned about reports that pro bono service by lawyers in large firms has
declined in recent years. The Commission also noted that the need for pro bono service is greater
than ever, given the withdrawal of most government support for legal service organizations, and
that the current system of providing needed pro bono service on a voluntary basis does not seem
to be working very effectively. In the end, however, it concluded that instituting a mandatory pro
bono requirement enforceable through the disciplinary process was not an effective way of
ameliorating this situation." And later, "[d]uring the debate over this rule, proponents of
mandatory pro bono service focused on the difficulty many citizens have in finding a way to pay
for the legal services they need, and justified mandatory pro bono service in terms of the proper
functioning of the legal system. Those who favored keeping the pro bono requirement voluntary
were also concerned about the provision of legal services to persons of limited means. However,
they feared that imposing pro bono work on unwilling practitioners would foster an atmosphere
of opposition and resentment that would be inconsistent with the ABA's goal of increasing pro
bono participation. They also argued that a lawyer's pro bono efforts are demeaned by a
mandatory rule and pointed to enforcement problems."). See generally David L. Shapiro, The
Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty To Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735, 735-39 (1980) (discussing the
ABA's efforts toward making pro bono work mandatory and advocating against such a
requirement).
21. Harvard Law School is an exemplar of this movement. See Harvard Law School, Office
of Clinical and Pro Bono Programs, http://www.law.harvard.edulacademics/probonofaq/
?template=second (last visited Nov. 14, 2009) (setting forth policy).
22. See Yuval Feldman & Alon Harel, Social Norms and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An
Experimental Analysis of the Rule v. Standard Dilemma 4 (July 5, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=914164) (undertaking empirical analysis in
which legal norms are divided into rules and standards but noting, "[iun [the social norms]
literature, legal norms are perceived as a single, homogeneous unified category. In particular,
that literature has not given attention to the degree of specificity of legal norms, implying that
the interaction between social norms and legal rules is indistinguishable from the interaction
between social norms and legal standards. Similarly, the law and economics literature on the
optimal specificity of legal norms is deficient in that it has concentrated on economic
considerations, but failed to account for the behavioral factors examined in this paper." (citations
omitted)).
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valuable, but it does not tell the whole story because it assumes that
the norm-content will be paired with mandatory operators. Thus, it
ignores the possibility of applying aspirational norms-an important
option, as our ABA example demonstrates. As discussed below, our
isolation of aspirational and mandatory operators, as well as rules and
standards, provides insight into behaviors that defy the deterrence
hypothesis.
A. Motivation Crowding
Studying both norm-content and operator allows the isolation
of an important psychological phenomenon: motivation crowding. This
behavioral effect challenges conventional wisdom because it captures
instances in which people do not behave in a manner consistent with
the deterrence hypothesis.
Nearly forty years ago, R.M. Titmuss hypothesized that
offering a reward for blood donation would undermine the social value
that serves to motivate donors, thereby bringing about a net reduction
in blood donation. 23 The data bear out his prediction: When donors
volunteer blood they appear to experience an intrinsic reward from
complying with a moral norm. This intrinsic reward motivates their
generous behavior. But when donors are paid for blood, they
reconceptualize the reward in monetary terms, which thereby inhibits
their intrinsic motivation. Thus, individuals are less likely to donate
blood when they get paid an amount less than their intrinsic
motivation. The existence of an incentive scheme "crowds out"
intrinsic moral motivations which, ultimately, would have been more
potent.
Similar crowding-out effects have been documented with
penalties (as opposed to rewards). One of the most famous
experiments analyzed Israeli daycare centers and found that the
introduction of a penalty actually increased the frequency of the
penalized conduct. 24 Parents would sometimes arrive late to collect
their children at the daycare centers, forcing a teacher to stay after
closing time. In response, a small monetary fine for late parents was
introduced. The deterrence hypothesis predicts that, when negative
consequences are introduced in connection with a behavior, the
frequency of that behavior should decline. The researchers found,
however, that after the introduction of the fine, the number of late23. RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIrr RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY
245-46 (1970).
24. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2000).
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coming parents increased significantly. In short, the parents acted as
if the fine were nothing more than the low price for showing up late.
The researchers concluded that the results challenge the value of the
deterrence hypothesis as a predictive theory. 25
Crowding out complicates the deterrence hypothesis. It
suggests that, in order to bring about an overall increase in a desired
behavior, monetary incentives in norms must exceed intrinsic
motivation. In other words, such interventions must at least be
powerful enough to cover the spread created by the crowding out of
antecedent intrinsic motivation. Thus, the idea is not that subjects
will never act as money maximizers but that the conversion of subjects
into money maximizers comes with a cost that must be overcome.
Academics have considered the implications of crowding out for pro
bono policy, 26 but they have not yet undertaken a behavioral analysis
such as we present here.
B. Anchoring
Another psychological phenomenon that deserves consideration
is the tendency to "anchor" self-generated responses on external cues.
Anchoring should be a concern in virtually any setting in which
numerical values are encountered. 7 Because the bright-line norms
used in our experiment utilize numerical values, they provide an
opportunity to learn more about how different normative operators
affect anchoring.
Anchoring is the assimilation in one's judgment of a numeric
estimate to a previously considered standard. 28 In the seminal
anchoring experiment, participants were first asked to guess whether
the percentage of African nations in the UN was greater than or less
than a randomly selected number. 29 Then, participants were asked to

25. Id. at 1.
26. See, e.g., Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tending the Generous Heart: Mandatory Pro Bono and
Moral Development, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 476 (2001) (discussing "field studies involving
public goods analogous to law [that] examine the effects of external factors on altruistic
motivation" including the work of Titmuss).
27. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom:
The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 355 (1999) ("Anchoring
effects have been demonstrated in a variety of applied contexts, e.g., gambling, real estate prices,
estimating chances of nuclear war, and estimating confidence intervals." (citations omitted)).
28. Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, The Semantics of Anchoring, 86 ORG. BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 234, 234 (2001).
29. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristicsand
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128 (1974).
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provide their best estimate of the exact percentage.30 The researchers
observed that subjects' estimates were biased toward the random
numbers used in their initial comparisons. 31 Thus, the median
estimate of participants receiving a random anchor of "10" was 25
percent, whereas for those receiving a random anchor of "65" it was 45
percent. 32
Given that people will anchor responses on completely random
numbers, it is unsurprising that anchoring also occurs with relevant,
non-random numbers. For example, scientists Birte Englich and
Thomas Mussweiler conducted a simulation in which subjects (either
law students or actual judges) were asked to assume the role of a
judge and sentence defendants.33 They found that their subjects
changed sentencing decisions significantly based upon the
recommendation of a prosecutor or, in a separate simulation, a known
legal novice. 34 "Judges who considered a high demand of 34 months
gave final sentences that were almost 8 months longer than judges
who considered a low demand of 12 months . . . for the identical

crime." 35 Similarly, separate research shows that in personal injury
cases, the numerical request for compensation exerts a gravitational
pull on the eventual reward.36
Like motivation crowding, anchoring can cause subjects to
behave in a manner that is inconsistent with conventional
assumptions about how people will behave under norms: anchored
subjects can be drawn to a figure within a norm against their own
interest. As mentioned, higher initial offers in negotiation can cause
offerees to become anchored to that initial number, leading them to
settle at higher final amounts. 37 While this finding does not itself
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects
in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1535, 1538-39, 1542, 1545 (2001).
34. Id. at 1547.
35. Thomas Mussweiler, Birte Englich & Fritz Strack, Anchoring Effect, in COGNITIVE
ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGEMENT AND MEMORY 183
(Ridiger F. Pohl ed., 2004).
36. Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask For, the More You Get:
Anchoring in PersonalInjury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519, 538 (1996); Mollie
W. Marti & Roselle L. Wissler, Be Careful What You Ask For: The Effect of Anchors on Personal
Injury Damages Awards, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. APPLIED 91, 99 (2000); see also Reid
Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, JurorJudgment in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiffs
Requests and Plaintiffs Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 445, 467
(1999) (finding a similar effect in punitive damages).
37. JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND
NEGOTIATION 266-69 (1975).
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challenge the deterrence hypothesis, we can imagine situations in
which the introduction of a bright-line restriction could cause
anchoring and, contrary to legislative design, bring about an increase
in the average amount of undesirable conduct. For example, consider a
state that has decided to enact a law imposing the very first cap on
contingency fees, forbidding fees above 30 percent. The state enacted
the law because it believed that lawyers generally are paid too much
and that this measure was a quick way to reduce overall fees. The
state reasoned that contingency fees above 30 percent would be
reduced to comply with the law and that all other fees (under 30
percent) would simply remain the same because they were already
legal. Under this reasoning, the net result should be a total reduction
in fees. We can further imagine, however, that before the law was
enacted, a typical lawyer's client believed it was appropriate to pay no
more 20 percent for a contingency fee. After learning of the new law,
that client might change her mind about the appropriate fee and agree
to pay 25 percent. If this anchoring phenomenon were widespread, the
state's introduction of the 30 percent maximum could lead to a total
increase in fees, despite and counter to the law's underlying rationale.
Our experiment affords an opportunity to test the effect of
anchoring on charitable behavior. As discussed below, we utilize a
numerical minimum in our bright-line conditions, directing that
subjects give at least a certain number of dollars to a charity.
Accordingly, we may see anchoring effects in our results. If there is
any anchoring effect, we should be able to isolate it in the case of
aspirational rules. These norms utilize bright-line, quantifiable
minimums of charitable giving (described below) and therefore provide
a numerical cue that could lead to assimilation. The norms do not,
however, use that numerical cue as a trigger for a sanction. Therefore,
a greater concentration of giving at or near the minimums under those
conditions is likely to be largely the result of a relevant anchoring
effect. Like the study of the effect of recommended sentences on
subsequent judicial determinations, we can use our aspirational rules
to determine whether anchoring occurs in this context.
II. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSES OF NORMS

This Section examines in greater detail the distinction between
bright-line and moral norm-content, as well as the distinction between
aspirational and mandatory norm operators. We explore their distinct
capacities to influence deliberation and choice, which is a focus of past
conceptual analyses of norms and normative language. This discussion
lays the groundwork for the experimental hypotheses discussed below.
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Moreover, the conceptual analysis in this Section should make it
easier for others fruitfully to modify or extend the parameters of our
experiment.

A. Norm-Content
Norms can be characterized by the content they include. In
short, rules have well-drawn content. They provide the person
applying the rule with a very good idea of the intended state of affairs
that is supposed to result from its compliance. Standards contain
content that narrows the options of the applying person to some
degree. But, in the end, standards invite her to use discretion to
fashion the specific instantiation of the directive's content for that
case. 38
When judges need only compare behavior to specified rules,
they can act in a somewhat mechanical fashion because they are
required to conduct only minimal evaluation. For instance, consider
the directive, "Park patrons must speak at a level below seventy-five
decibels." Assuming the decibel level is known, its bright-line normcontent makes a high proportion of determinations under the rule the
result of a simple, almost mechanical process. 39 We can imagine
38. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term: Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58-59 (1992) (defining a rule as a directive that
"binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering
facts. Rules aim to confine the decisionmaker to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and
subjective value choices to be worked out elsewhere . . . . A legal directive is 'standard'-like when
it tends to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or
policy to a fact situation. Standards . . . [give] the decisionmaker more discretion than do rules.
Standards allow the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the totality of the
circumstances. Thus, the application of a standard in one case ties the decisionmaker's hand in
the next case less than does a rule - the more facts one may take into account, the more likely
that some of them will be different the next time." (citations omitted)); see also FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 104 n.35 (1991) (arguing that even if rules are more specific than
standards, rules are not necessarily more likely to be followed); Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 382-83 (1985) (describing a rule as a directive with "a hard
empirical trigger and a hard determinate response" and a standard as one with "a soft evaluative
trigger and a soft modulated response").
39. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 559-60 (1992) ("For example, a rule may entail an advance determination of what conduct is
permissible, leaving only factual issues for the adjudicator. (A rule might prohibit 'driving in
excess of 55 miles per hour on expressways.') A standard may entail leaving both specification of
what conduct is permissible and factual issues for the adjudicator. (A standard might prohibit
'driving at an excessive speed on expressways.')"); Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush
v. Gore: Form and the Law of Democracy, 37 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 73-75 (2002) ("Clear
rules force decisionmakers to act in a certain way in response to certain facts, and thus promote
uniform, consistent, efficient, fair, and neutral decisions. Actors are able to understand and
comply with bright-line rules, and thus are able to act in predictable, productive ways.").
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similarly mechanical cases for laws such as voting age requirements
or speed limits. In our empirical study presented below, we used such
a quantitative "bright-line" as a paradigmatic example of rule-like
norm-content.
Standards, on the other hand, require substantial evaluation,
typically inviting consideration of the abstract principles motivating
the norm. Consider, for instance, the directive, "Park patrons must
speak at a polite, reasonable level." The application of this standard
requires considerable discretion. While all standards use evaluative
content, only some use moral content. For example, the standard,
"Park patrons must not speak loudly," is a subjective but non-moral
standard. We encounter moral content frequently, however; it is
marked by words such as "good," "charitable," "malicious," and of
course "moral." Because moral terms are so clearly evaluative, they
are the paradigmatic example of a standard. Accordingly, we have
chosen to use a standard with moral content in our experiment.
B. Operatorsand Norm Species
Norms can be categorized according to the operator that they
use. Here, we focus on the distinction between mandatory norms (e.g.,
"must") and aspirational norms (e.g., "ought to"). Legal philosophers
have asserted that mandatory norms work, in a sense, by shortcircuiting the deliberation of those subject to them in favor of their
directive. Joseph Raz, for example, explains that "it must be admitted
that for the most part the presence of a [mandatory norm] is
decisive .... The whole purpose of having [mandatory norms] is to
achieve this simplification."40
Oftentimes, mandatory norms are paired with sanctions. By
"sanction" we mean "a penalty attached to the breach of a norm
typically, though not always, meant to discourage breaches of that

40.

JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 79 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1975). Raz

explains that the authoritative nature of mandatory norms comes from their power to exclude
from our deliberation many of our own reasons in favor or against pursuing a particular action.

Id.
The fact that [mandatory norms] are exclusionary reasons enables them to
achieve this purpose . . . . [Mandatory norms] have a relative independence

from the reasons which justify them. In order to know that the norm is valid
we must know that there are reasons which justify it. But we need not know
what these reasons are in order to apply the norm correctly to the majority of
cases.

Id.

2010]

EVALUATING NORMS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

69

norm."4 1 Whether it is conceptually necessary that a mandatory norm
attach to some mechanism for punishing noncompliant subjects has
been debated, especially in the context of analytic legal philosophy.
For example, many legal theorists have maintained that, as a
conceptual matter, law must be backed by sanctions. 42 Our experiment
sidesteps this debate by using both mandatory language and a formal
sanction to create unambiguously mandatory norms.
Aspirational norms are recognized as a distinct type in
practical philosophy. "[R]easons [that] exhibit what we might refer to
as an aspirational character .. . count in favor of the actions they
recommend in a way that leaves the deliberating agent with some
discretion to ignore or to discount their claims." 4 3 Thus, whereas
mandatory norms are designed largely to circumvent a subject's
personal practical reasoning, aspirational norms are designed to
participatein a subject's reasoning.
A unique function of aspirations is that they provide reasons in
favor of supererogatory conduct. Supererogation is the notion that
certain actions can be morally superior but not compulsory. 44 This idea
presents a problem for practical reasoning theorists, some of whom
struggle to explain how the best possible course of action is not simply
compulsory. 45 But practical experience shows that people truly adhere
to the principle of supererogation in their deliberation: for example,
almost no one believes that charitable giving is always required, but

41. Ekow N. Yankah, The Force of Law: The Role of Coercion in Legal Norms 21 (Mar. 1,
2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://works.bepress.com/ekow-yankah/1). But see
Hans Oberdiek, The Role of Sanctions and Coercion in UnderstandingLaw and Legal Systems,
21 AM. J. JURIS. 71, 75 (1976) (asserting that sanctions are always meant to deter).
42. Early legal positivists, such as John Austin and Jeremy Bentham, viewed law as
general commands-mandatory norms-given by a sovereign to a population with a habit of
obedience to the sovereign, coupled with the threat of sanctions for noncompliance. See JOHN
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 21 (Wilfred E. Rumble ed., Cambridge

Univ. Press 1995) (1832) ("Every law or rule ... is a command."). Even in the twentieth century,
some highly regarded legal philosophers, such as Hans Kelsen, held this view. See HANS KELSEN,
PURE THEORY OF LAW 33 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) (1934); see also JOSEPH
RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM

152-53 (2d ed. 1980) (arguing that legal norms directed at high-ranking officials may exist
without sanctions, but duty-imposing norms not directed at officials must be backed by
sanctions).
43. R. Jay Wallace, The Deontic Structure of Morality 3-4 (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://philosophy.berkeley.edu/people/files/21).
44.

See

DAVID

HEYD,

SUPEREROGATION:

("[Slupererogatory acts are ...
moral duty. . . .").
45.

ITS

STATUS

IN ETHICAL

THEORY

1

(1982)

those acts which a person does over and above his religious or

See JOSHUA GERT, BRUTE RATIONALITY: NORMATIVITY AND HUMAN ACTION 106-08

(2004) ("How can all the relevant reasons unambiguously favor [an] action, and yet not make it
rationally required?").
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many would agree that, in at least some scenarios, it is the right thing
to do on the balance of reasons. 46 Thus, the content of an aspirational
norm can serve as an information provider, indicating which conduct
is supererogatory.
The key to the aspirational operator is that it must be weaker
than a mandate but stronger than a permission. Recently, linguists
have recognized this phenomenon. They call terms that exhibit this
character "weak necessity modals" 4 7 : the operator is meant to reflect
the user's preferences for potential states of affairs or modalities.
Aspirational language, under this view, employs words that reflect
weaker preferences than mandatory/deontic language. Some linguists
identify terms such as "ought" and "should" as weak necessity
modals. 48 Accordingly, in the experiment presented below we adopted
a weak necessity modal ("ought") as an aspirational operator.
While we expressed some reservation about toothless
mandatory norms, we have the inverse concern with respect to
aspirational norms. An aspirational norm with a formal punishment
for noncompliance is arguably a mandatory norm and certainly would

46. Joseph Raz suggested that a certain, specific type of permission, an "exclusionary
permission," has a second-order power, making supererogation an understandable deliberative
phenomenon. RAZ, supra note 40, at 96.
47. See Kai von Fintel & Sabine latridou, How to Say Ought in Foreign:The Composition of
Weak Necessity Modals, in TIME AND MODALITY 115 (Jacqueline Gueron & Jacqueline Lecarme
eds., 2008). According to von Fintel and Iatridou, the sentence "you ought to do the dishes" can
be distinguished from the sentence "you must do the dishes" because:
[The former] means not that among the favored worlds, most are worlds where you do
the dishes. Rather, it means that among the favored worlds, all the very best ones are
worlds where you do the dishes. That is, the ought-claim makes a further distinction
as to how good particular worlds among the favored world are. So, the central idea we
would want to capture in a semantics for ought is this: ought p says that among the
favored worlds, p-worlds are better than non-p-worlds . . . . And in the [directive] case,
ought might be sensitive to less coercive sets of rules and principles in addition to the
laws and regulations that strong necessity modals would be interpreted with respect
to.
Id. at 118-19.
48. Until recently, it has been a tradition in deontic logic to conflate "ought" with "must." In
other words, the operator "ought" was associated with mandatory norms. Recently, however,
some in the field have recognized that "ought" is popularly equated with weak necessity, as we
do here. See Paul McNamara, Making Room for Going Beyond the Call, 105 MIND 415, 415-50
(1996) (arguing that there is a middle ground between obligatory and permissible actions). There
is much detailed research remaining to be done on the fine distinctions between different modal
expressions. "Consider for example the fact that ought to and have to somehow differ in strength
in their deontic use: You ought to call your mother, but of course you don't have to." Kai von
Fintel, Modality and Language, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY app. at 20, 22 (Donald M.
Borchert ed., 2d ed. 2006).
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cause confusion. 49 Thus, we will not attach a formals 0 sanction
mechanism to those norms that employ weak necessity modals.
III. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
The primary focus of our experiment is to provide a
quantitative measure of the degree of effectiveness 1 of various norm
combinations. Specifically, we tested how different norm combinations
served to motivate charitable giving to a legal services organization.
We provided subjects with a sum of $10 and then allowed them to
decide how much to donate. This Section begins by contextualizing our
experiment within existing research on other-regarding behavior and
then details our specific experimental methods and hypotheses.

A. The DictatorGame
This basic experimental design mirrors a widely used
methodology in the field of behavioral economics called the "Dictator
Game." Put simply, our subjects dictated the amount of the charitable
gift. We hope that our use of this paradigm can be an instructive casestudy for those who want to use experimental methods to inform legal
decisionmaking. 52 To that end, in this Section we discuss certain

49.

See NEV. R. PROF'L CONDUCT

§ 6.1(b)

(2006) ("The professional responsibility to provide

pro bono services . . . is aspirational rather than mandatory . . . . Accordingly, the failure to

render pro bono services will not subject a member to discipline."); Christine Chinkin, Normative
Development in the InternationalLegal System, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF
NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 21, 30 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000)
[hereinafter COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE] (categorizing instruments that "are based solely
upon voluntary adherence" as "soft law"); Xiaorong Li, License To Coerce: Violence Against
Women, State Responsibility, and Legal Failures in China's Family-PlanningProgram, 8 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 145, 182 (1996) ("Because no sanctions attached, member states' obligations
under the U.N. Charter and UDHR embody only aspirational norms. . . .").
50. That said, we do not rule out the possibility that subjects might feel as though they
would suffer some sort of informal punishment for failing to heed the norms, even the
aspirational ones. For instance, some might worry that failing to give any money to charity
would cause them embarrassment if this fact were to become known. We would not expect this
possibility to alter the relative performance of each norm species, however, because these
informal sanctions would be the same for both the aspirational and mandatory norms. Moreover,
as discussed below, our anonymity reduces the role that these informal sanctions might play.
51. By effectiveness, we mean the numerical measure of the quality of the state of affairs
brought about by the employment of the norm combination. The quality of the state of affairs is
dictated by the interests of the promulgator. Here, what the promulgator wants is rather
straightforward: greater overall giving, a high proportion of people who give everything, a low
proportion of people who don't give at all, and the like.
52. This approach is growing more popular, especially in the New Legal Realism movement.
See Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can A New World Order
Prompt A New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (2009) (discussing the rise in use of
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features of our experimental methodology, and related methodologies,
in greater detail. The Dictator Game in its basic form is very simple.
The first player, the Allocator, is given control over a fixed sum of
money or some other severable resource. She is then instructed to
allocate the money between herself and a designated other player, the
Recipient. The Recipient has no say about the appropriate division
and must accept the result. The experimental question is, "How much
will the Allocator give?"
The Dictator Game was originally devised as a comparison to a
more complicated experimental game, "The Ultimatum Game," which
has become one of the most commonly utilized experimental
frameworks in behavioral economics and the social sciences. 53 The
Ultimatum Game is identical to the Dictator Game except that the
Recipient can influence whether the allocation is acceptable. If she
accepts, then the Allocator and Recipient get their respective shares.
If she rejects, then neither player gets anything. The Ultimatum
Game was devised to establish whether human beings' behavior fits
the homo economicus model, which posits that human beings are
rational and self-interested. 54
The operating assumptions of the Ultimatum Game are that
selfish behavior is exhibited by low offers from the first party (and
that altruistic behavior is exhibited by high offers), and that irrational
or fairness-based behavior is exhibited whenever the second party
rejects an offer. This is because, under the homo economicus view of
rational and self-interested individuals, both parties should
understand that any offer above zero should be accepted because it
represents "free money." Accordingly, those holding this view predict
that the first party will offer the smallest possible portion and that the
second party will accept it. The experiment rarely plays out in that

behavioral experimentation and reliance upon work in psychology as a means to challenge
neoclassical law and economics).
53. "The Ultimatum Game is quickly catching up with the Prisoner's Dilemma as a primeshowpiece of apparently irrational behavior. In the past two decades, it has inspired dozens of
theoretical and experimental investigations." Marin A. Nowak et al., Fairness Versus Reason in
the Ultimatum Game, 289 SCIENCE 1773, 1773 (2000).
54. Joseph Heinrich et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15
Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 73, 73-77 (2001) (relying on Ultimatum Game
experiments to suggest revisions to homo economicus model).
It bears mention that, given our goals, we have the luxury of not having to associate
behaviors with very specific internal states of mind. While our hypothesis is informed by what
we suppose a norm species will do to deliberation, our results analyze behavioral effect and
apparent psychological phenomena. We are agnostic about whether human behavior exhibits
true altruism or reason.
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fashion and therefore presents a challenge to the assumption of
rational, self-interested behavior.5 5
The problem with the Ultimatum Game for our purposes,
however, is that it does not suitably isolate the reasons for the
Allocator's behavior. The Allocator who gives an offer above the
smallest severable amount may be motivated by her interest in the
Recipient's well-being, but she may also be afraid that the Recipient
would reject the offer. By eliminating Recipient approval, the Dictator
Game arguably tells us the answer, which is that "both factors
matter [] ... [o]ffers in the dictator game are lower than in ultimatum
games, but (in most variations) are still positive."5 6
This aspect of the Dictator Game is critical for our experiment
because it suggests an intrinsic motive for generous behavior. We
expect that there will be a spread of allocations within the population
of subjects;5 7 this expectation makes it possible to isolate the effects of
our norm-operators and norm-content. Our experiment therefore adds
to the Dictator Game by subjecting players to different combinations
of norm-operator and norm-content.5 8
Although less significant, we also made the recipient a charity.
This reduced the likelihood that a subject would keep all the money to
herself. In fact, we expect an even wider spectrum of giving than
under the basic game precisely because we have made the recipient of
the allocation a charity, which tends to increase giving and the spread
of allocations.5 9
conditions of our
Lastly, in the mandatory-operator
experiment, we implemented a critical but necessary departure from
the standard Dictator Game structure: third-party enforcement of
55. See, e.g., James Andreoni et al., What Do Bargainer's Preferences Look Like?
Experiments With a Convex Ultimatum Game, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 672, 672 (2003) (finding that
half of subjects were maximizers and half had a preference for fairness); Colin Camerer &
Richard Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators,and Manners, 9 J. EcON. PERSP. 209, 210
(1995) (finding that offers of less than 20 percent of the sum of money are often rejected);
Heinrich, supra note 54, at 74 (describing "systematic deviations from the canonical model");
Nowak, supra note 53, at 1773 (noting that half of responders reject offers of less than 30
percent); Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 195, 197 (1988)
(noting that non-rational results in the Ultimatum Game imply non-monetary aspects of the
participant's utility function).
56. See Camerer, supra note 55, at 213 (citing Robert Forsythe et al., Fairness in Simple
Bargaining Experiments, 6 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 347-69 (1994); Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Fairnessand the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. Bus. 285, 285-300 (1986)).
57. This is especially true because we have made the recipient of the allocation a charity,
which tends to increase giving and the spread of allocations. See Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J.
Grossman, Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games, 16 GAMEs & ECON. BEHAV. 181, 181-90
(1996) (finding that donations increase when the recipient is generally agreed to be "deserving").
58. See supra Section IV for a lengthy discussion of the particulars of these combinations.
59. Id.
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norms via sanctioning. We turn next to methodological issues
surrounding this sanction mechanism.
B. OperationalizingNorm-Content and Norm-Operators
The history of ABA ethics regulation reflects the conventional
wisdom that mandatory rules with bright-line content will be more
effective than aspirational rules with moral content. But does this
view receive empirical support?
We investigated this question experimentally by offering
students at Harvard Law School the opportunity to donate up to $10
to a pro bono legal services fund under exposure to several different
norm types. Specifically, we allocated $10 to each student and then
offered them the opportunity to give any amount they wished ($0 to
$10) to "an out-of-state charitable organization that provides free or
reduced fee legal services to the indigent," while keeping the
remainder for themselves. Subjects were paid immediately in cash,
and the money they chose to donate was paid in full to Rhode Island
Legal Services.
Before making her decision, each subject was exposed to a
norm, and our experimental manipulation was to alter norm
combination. We varied norms both according to operator (aspirational
versus mandatory) and content (moral versus bright-line) in each
possible combination. Because we employed two different bright-line
minimums, there are a total of six different experimental conditions.
Each subject experienced only one condition, and we compared
patterns of giving between subjects. Approximately 35 subjects were
tested in each condition, totaling 213 subjects overall. Subjects in the
aspirational norm condition were told that they "ought" to give money
to the charitable organization. Subjects in the mandatory norm
condition were told that they were "required" to give money to the
charitable organization, and that this requirement was subject to
enforcement under an audit procedure.60
We attached a sanction mechanism to the mandatory operator.
For ethical reasons, and following previous research, we chose not to
use sanctions that would leave players worse off at the end of the

60. Specifically, the instructions read as follows:
A monitor in charge of providing payment will audit 1/10 of the submissions to
determine whether they comply with this condition. If the audit results in a finding
that a division does not comply, the student that submitted the division will be told
immediately in private and will not be given any money. Otherwise, students will be
paid the full amount that they decide to keep immediately at the end of the
experiment.
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experiment than at the beginning-in effect, taking money out of their
pockets. Accordingly, players were sanctioned by forfeiting their stake
in the $10 allocated at the beginning of the experiment if they were
"caught" giving less than the bright-line standard.
Our sanction mechanism was a probabilistic audit. Each
allocation under a mandatory norm operator had a 10 percent chance
of being audited. Two goals motivated a probabilistic enforcement
mechanism. First, we wished to mirror the "real world," where
enforcement is rarely guaranteed. Second, we wished to introduce a
meaningful temptation to cheat. The results show that we succeeded
in this regard: 18.9 percent were non-compliant under bright-line
content.61 With a one-in-ten probability of being audited, subjects
actually profited on average by choosing to cheat. Here, again, we
paralleled real-world cases where expected utility favors illegal
conduct; tax evasion is a familiar example. 62
For our moral norm-content, we drew inspiration from the 1908
Canons, quoted in part below:
The future of the Republic, to a great extent, depends upon our maintenance of Justice
pure and unsullied. It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the motives of
the members of our profession are such as to merit the approval of all just men. 6 3
When rendering . .. improper service or advice, the lawyer invites and merits stern and
just condemnation. Correspondingly, he advances the honor of his profession and the
best interests of his client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress

61. It is impossible to predict the percentage of people who will be noncompliant to a norm
to which they are subject. Anecdotally, it would seem that the number is far less than 50 percent.
One area in which there has been much study of this is in the realm of the federal income tax.
While no one has been able to determine with precision the percentage of noncompliant
taxpayers, the I.R.S. conducted a three-year study called the National Research Program and
found that the difference between taxes owed and taxes actually paid represented nearly onefifth of all taxes collected by the I.R.S. Stephen J. Dubner & Steven D. Levitt, Filing in the Tax
Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2006, Magazine, at 26. Although less trustworthy, survey results are
largely consistent: they indicate that approximately 13 percent admit to cheating. RoperASW
Poll
(2003),
available at
www.bankrate.com/brm/itax/news/20030415bl.asp?print=on.
Approximately 21 percent do not believe that it is morally wrong not to report all income on their
taxes. PEW RESEARCH CTR., A BAROMETER OF MODERN MORALS: SEX, DRUGS AND THE 1040, at 1
(2006),
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/307/a-barometer-of-modern-morals.
We find similar
proportions in fraudulent billing. See Darlene Ricker, Greed, Ignorance and Overbilling, A.B.A.
J., Aug. 1994, at 62, 63 (citing a study revealing that approximately 5-10 percent of audits of law
firm billing found actual fraud). Thus, there is little reason to think that our numbers are not
representative of real-world noncompliance.
62. James Alm, Tax Evasion, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY (Joseph
J. Cordes et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) ("Despite these measurement difficulties, it appears that tax
evasion is a widespread and growing problem in the United States. The most reliable estimates
project the amount of the federal 'tax gap'-or the amount of federal income taxes due but not
collected-at $127 billion for 1992 and suggest an annual growth rate of roughly 10 percent since
1973 (Internal Revenue Service 1996). More recent IRS estimates put the 2002 tax gap at $311
billion. State and local governments also report problems with noncompliance and evasion.").
63. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS pmbl. (1908).
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upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest principles of
6
moral law. 4

This is not a perfect fit, of course. We are testing students who
may eventually serve the public as lawyers, but they are not doing so
yet. Thus, our moral norm text read:
When you were granted admission to this law school, you were given the privilege of
receiving a superlative legal education and the opportunity to become a public leader.
These benefits, however, come with the expectation that you will conduct yourself
professionally in a way that reflects a respect for justice, honesty, and fairness.
Accordingly, when you apportion this money between yourself and the charitable
organization, you [ought / are required] to do so in compliance with the strictest moral
principles.

Our language attempted to capture the spirit of the Canons,
especially insofar as we emphasized the particular privileges and
responsibilities incumbent upon Harvard Law School students.
Indeed, such moralizing preambles are frequently paired with norms
that have moral norm-content, whether the ABA's code of ethics, 65
education legislation in many states,66 the transitional Iraqi
Constitution,67 or the American Medical Association's code of ethics.68

64. Id. Canon 32 (emphasis added).
65. See id. pmbl. ("In America, where the stability of Courts and of all departments of
government rests upon the approval of the people, it is peculiarly essential that the system for
establishing and dispensing Justice be developed to a high point of efficiency and so maintained
that the public shall have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of its
administration. The future of the Republic, to a great extent, depends upon our maintenance of
Justice pure and unsullied. It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the motives of the
members of our profession are such as to merit the approval of all just men.").
66. See John Dinan, The Meaning of State ConstitutionalEducation Clauses: Evidence from
the ConstitutionalConvention Debates, 70 ALB. L. REV. 927, 939-42 (2006) (discussing usage of
prefatory clauses of this sort in several states' aspirational education legislation).
67. See Feisal Amin al-Istrabadi, Reviving Constitutionalism in Iraq: Key Provisions of the
Transitional Administrative Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 269, 271-72 (2005) ("Generally
speaking, the TAL [Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period] is a
very liberal, forward-looking document. It is in many respects an exhortatory document, rather
than a descriptive one, as the current situation in Iraq is far from the idyllic place described in
the TAL. This fact is clear even from the Preamble, one of the last sections written. The
Preamble is aspirational in its rejection of violence, its reassertion of the sovereignty of the
people of Iraq, its determination to commit Iraq to adherence to international law, and its
attempt to reclaim Iraq's rightful place amongst the family of civilized nations.").
68. See AMA CODE OF MED. ETHICS, Principles of Med. Ethics pmbl. (2001) ("The medical
profession has long subscribed to a body of ethical statements developed primarily for the benefit
of the patient. As a member of this profession, a physician must recognize responsibility to
patients first and foremost, as well as to society, to other health professionals, and to self. The
following Principles adopted by the American Medical Association are not laws, but standards of
conduct which define the essentials of honorable behavior for the physician.").
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For the bright-line norm-content, we specified an exact
standard of charitable 69 giving: for some subjects, at least $3 out of
$10; and for other subjects, at least $7 out of $10. Specifically, subjects
were instructed: "When you apportion this money between yourself
and the charitable organization, you [ought / are required] to give a
minimum 70 of [$3 / $7] to the charitable organization." The preceding
paragraph from the moral norm-content condition ("When you were
granted admission . .. respect for justice, honesty and fairness") was
entirely omitted in the bright-line norm-content condition for two
reasons. First, inclusion of moral terminology would make the effect of
bright-line content muddy. Second, such preambles are not typically
used in connection with bright-line mandatory norms.
Our choice of $3 and $7 bright-line standards reflects a
deliberate attempt to provide subjects with bright-line amounts both
above and below an even $5 split between the subject and the
charitable organization. Preliminary pilot testing for moral normcontent revealed a $5/$5 split of funds to be a popular choice, and the
average amount given was $6.33.71 A bright-line amount of $7 thus
tests whether bright-line rules can outperform moral rules when they
demand a higher level of giving, while a bright-line amount of $3 tests
whether bright-line rules underperform moral rules when they
demand a lower level of giving.
In summary, we tested six experimental conditions, which we
paraphrase below:
(1) Aspirational operator / moral content: You ought to give
according to the strictest moral standards.
(2) Aspirational operator / $3 bright-line content: You ought to
give $3.

69. In this paper, we will describe all giving to Rhode Island Legal Services as "charitable"
regardless of whether the student was subject to a mandatory or aspirational norm. We realize,
of course, that there are interesting questions about whether giving money to a charity because
one would be punished otherwise qualifies as "charitable," "altruistic," "prosocial," "pro bono,"
etc. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram et al., An Informal Discussion on Legal Ethics, 2 J. INST. STUD.
LEG. ETHICS 427, 429 (1999) (Remarks of Burnele V. Powell, stating: "First of all, I want to be
very clear that I don't think there is any such thing as mandatory pro bono. If it's mandatory, it's
not pro bono."). Such questions are not our focus here, however. Except where otherwise noted,
our approach is like the I.R.S.'s: for the sake of simplicity we call "charitable" the behavior of
giving to a charitable organization regardless of the actual motivation for that behavior.
70. These are set forth as minimums both to mimic real-world regulation of charitynaturally, organizations and governments do not ordinarily seek to cap charitable acts-and so
as to give the deterrence hypothesis the best chance of success with the mandatory norms.
71. The pilot used the same language and instructions as the subsequent experiment.

78

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1:55

(3) Aspirational operator / $7 bright-line content: You ought to
give $7.
(4) Mandatory operator / moral content: You are required to
give according to the strictest moral standards, and you could
be punished for noncompliance.
(5) Mandatory operator / $3 bright-line content: You are
required to give $3, and you could be punished for noncompliance.
(6) Mandatory operator / $7 bright-line content: You are
required to give $7, and you could be punished for noncompliance.
C. FurtherDetails
In interpersonal games of this sort, experimenters are typically
concerned about whether the stakes are high enough that the players
behave in a fashion that resembles their behavior in the real world.
With de minimis stakes, the risk exists that the players will not care
enough to behave in a thoughtful fashion. It is generally accepted that
in Ultimatum Games, $10 is sufficient, and most experiments have
used that amount or less. 7 2 The same is true for Dictator Games.73
We conducted our test on 213 students at Harvard Law School.
While it might be optimal to test working lawyers, it is harder to
assemble such a group without introducing a considerable bias and a
high cost. Law students are already assembled and can be selected
randomly from within that assembly. Game types were provided to the
students in each class randomly but in approximately equal
proportion. Students were asked not to participate if they had already
played or had discussed strategies for the experiment. We further

72. Elizabeth Hoffman et al., On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum
Games, 25 INT'L J. GAME THEORY 289, 289-301 (1996) (stating that the amount bargained in
ultimatum games is "typically not more than $10," but cautioning that in certain, but not all,
contexts, $100 stakes produce different results); William Robert Nelson, Jr., Incorporating
Fairness into Game Theory and Economics: Comment, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1180, 1181 (2001)
("Player one [in the ultimatum game] is told to propose the division of a sum of money (M), often
ten dollars .... In the many ultimatum games that have been run with stakes in the $10 range,
the modal offer is one-half.").
73. See, e.g., Daniel Read, Monetary Incentives, What Are They Good For?, 12 J. ECON.
METHODOLOGY 265, 269 (2005) ("As in dictator games even when the stakes are pretty large
($100) people offer the same proportion of that stake as when they are small, or even
hypothetical." (citations omitted)).
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asked if they had heard about the experiment (even if they hadn't
discussed strategy), in order to determine whether to discard those
results. No one running the experiment knew any of the subjects
tested, and the subjects were never asked to give their names to the
experimenters. The subjects were asked to fold up their responses (so
that others could not see them) and not to look at other players during
the game. They were paid on a one-on-one basis anonymously and
outside of the classroom in which the experiment was conducted.
Every effort was taken to have payment take place out of sight from
others.
We chose to have students allocate money to a pro bono legal
service organization with the hope that they would experience at least
some intrinsic motivation toward charity. This manipulation on the
basic Dictator Game has previously been used in research. 74 To reduce
potential bias by the Allocators, we did not name a specific charitable
organization to our subjects;7 5 the legal world is small, and it is
possible that students might have had some personal experiences,
positive or negative, with the charity chosen. Accordingly, we stated,
"The [money not apportioned to oneself] will be given to an out-of-state
charitable organization that provides free or reduced fee legal services
to the indigent."

D. Hypotheses
We now turn to our hypotheses. The received view, as we
understand it, is that mandatory operators and bright-line content
should induce higher levels of giving, while aspirational operators and
moral content should induce lower levels of giving. 76
Based on past psychological research, however, we
hypothesized that the introduction of an incentive-based intervention
under the norm would crowd out many subjects' intrinsic motivation
to be charitable. That is, we predicted that aspirational operators
would reveal subjects' intrinsic motivation for generosity, while
mandatory operators would crowd out that intrinsic motivation. Thus,
we hypothesized that moral content would elicit lower levels of giving
in the mandatory condition than in the aspirational condition.
74. See Eckel & Grossman, supra note 57, at 181-91 (making Recipient of the experiment a
local chapter of the American Red Cross).
75. As to the particular charity, we chose to keep it relevant to the pro bono work theme.
Accordingly, we wanted it to be a charity that provided free or reduced rate legal services to the
indigent-the bread and butter of pro bono work. We chose Rhode Island Legal Services.
76. See Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 5, at 3 (finding that mandatory fines helped clarify
and change actors' vision of the world in which they live).
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However, we also hypothesized an important role for brightline norm-content in determining the behavioral effect of crowding
out. Specifically, crowding out should reduce giving only when
subjects' intrinsic charitable motivations exceed the extrinsic
motivation of the mandatory norm. Indeed, some studies have
attempted to show that crowding out only becomes noticeable when
the intervention is not powerful enough77 and that there remains
considerable support for the economic assumption that incentives are
generally effective.78 Thus, we predicted that mandatory operators
paired with $3 bright-line content will reduce charitable giving
relative to aspirational operators. By contrast, mandatory operators
paired with a $7 bright-line content should not reduce charitable
giving relative to aspirational operators. In fact, a mandatory rule set
above the level of intrinsic motivation may successfully yield more
generous gifts. At $7, the acceptable minimum donation would exceed
the average gift in the pilot experiment by sixty-seven cents.
Lastly, we predicted that subjects would exhibit an anchoring
effect in our aspirational bright-line norms. 79 In particular, we
expected that our subjects would be drawn toward the aspirational
bright-line minimum amount in making their divisions, just as the
sentencing decisions of judges gravitated toward recommended
sentences in Englich and Mussweiler's experiment.80
IV. RESULTS
Our results yield two general findings: (A) mandatory norms
featuring moral content led to lower levels of giving than did
aspirational norms with moral content, and (B) bright-line normcontent affected the level of giving under mandatory operators but not
under aspirational operators.

77. See Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVEYS
589, 607 (2001) (noting that intrinsic motivations will "not always prevail over the traditional
relative price effect").
78. See, e.g., Robert Gibbons, Incentives and Careers in Organizations,in 2 ADVANCES IN
ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS 1, 16-26 (David Kreps & Ken Wallis eds., Seventh World
Congress 1997) (examining the effects of incentive pay on work performance); Canice
Prendergast, The Provisionof Incentives in Firms, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 7, 7 (1999) (remarking that
"[ilncentives are the essence of economics").
79. In making this prediction, we are of course implicitly asserting that anchoring will not
be so pronounced that it will nullify significant differences in giving between equivalent brightline aspirational and mandatory norms.
80. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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A. Mandatory/MoralNorms Led to Lower Levels of Giving Than Did
Aspirational/MoralNorms
Based on previous research into the crowding out of intrinsic
motivations by extrinsic reward and punishment, we predicted that
mandatory operators paired with moral norm-content would lead to
lower levels of giving than would aspirational operators paired with
moral norm-content. Our experiment confirmed this prediction.
The mean level of giving under the aspirational operator was
$6.17, whereas it was only $4.56 under the mandatory operator. This
predicted effect was statistically significant (t(70) = 1.8, p < .05, onetailed).
Inspection of individual responses revealed that, whenever
moral norm-content was used, subjects were highly likely to give $0,
$5, or $10. In fact, 75 percent of subjects gave one of those three
amounts, while only 25 percent gave $1, $2, $3, $4, $6, $7, $8, or $9.
Additionally, the higher rate of giving under aspirational operators
versus mandatory operators was driven principally by a higher
proportion of subjects giving exactly $10, and a lower proportion of
subjects giving exactly $0. Under an aspirational operator, 44 percent
of subjects gave all $10 and only 11 percent gave nothing, while under
a mandatory operator 25 percent of subjects gave all $10 and 28
percent gave nothing. The ratio of $10-to-$0 giving between these two
conditions differed with statistical significance (Pearson X2(1, N=39) =
4.5, p < .05, two-tailed).

B. Bright-Line Norm-Content Affected Giving under Mandatory
Operators but Not AspirationalOperators
How successful is bright-line norm-content at inducing giving
at specified levels? Our results indicated that the answer depends on
the type of operator used: mandatory operators rendered bright-line
standards relatively more effective than aspirational operators.
We hypothesized that crowding out would lead to higher levels
of giving under an aspirational operator with $3 bright-line content
relative to a mandatory operator with $3 bright-line content. Although
the mean level of giving with $3 bright-line content was higher under
an aspirational operator (mean = $6.05) than under a mandatory
operator (mean = $5.03), this difference was not statistically
significant (t(69) = 1.2, p > .10, one-tailed).
When a bright-line norm-content of $7 was used, there was no
evidence of an advantage for an aspirational operator. In fact, as
hypothesized, the mean level of giving was higher under a mandatory
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operator ($6.85) than under an aspirational operator ($6.25). This
difference was slight, however, and it was not statistically significant
(t(68) = 0.6, p> .50).
Nevertheless, reliable differences between the two operators
emerged when we looked at the trends across the norm-content
conditions under each operator. At the most general level, we can ask
whether the mean level of giving systematically varied between the
three levels of norm-content we used: moral norms, $3 bright-line
norms, and $7 bright-line norms. We tested the specific hypothesis
that giving would be lowest at a $3 bright line, intermediate with
moral content (consistent with the findings of our pilot study), and
highest at a $7 bright line. We tested the specific hypothesis that
giving would be lowest with moral content, intermediate with a $3
bright line, and highest at a $7 bright line. Analysis of variance
("ANOVA") revealed no significant differences in the mean level of
giving between the three norm-content conditions within the
aspirational norm-operator condition (F(2,106) = .024, ns). The mean
level of giving stayed steadily within the range $6.05 to $6.25
regardless of the suggested bright-line amount.81 Thus, contrary to our
predictions, there was no significant anchoring effect under the
aspirational norms. For mandatory norms, by contrast, ANOVA
revealed that the mean level of giving differed significantly between
the three norm-contents (F(2,101) = 3.42, p < .05). Giving was the
lowest for moral norm-content, intermediate at the $3 bright-line
amount, and highest at the $7 bright-line amount. 82
More specifically, we can ask whether bright-line standards
induce giving at the precise value of the bright-line norm. We found
that the mandatory operator produced larger numbers of subjects who
gave exactly the minimum specified, whether $3 or $7, compared to
the aspirational operator. Subjects were more than three times as
likely to give the bright-line amount specified under the mandatory
operator (29 percent of subjects) than under the aspirational operator
(8 percent of subjects), and the difference in proportions was
significant (Pearson X2 (1, N=140) = 10.5, p < .001, two-tailed). Notably,
the aspirational operators appeared more likely to produce subjects
who gave $5, an amount that attracts intrinsic fairness motivations,
than the applicable bright-line amount. Under bright lines, subjects
were twice as likely to give $5 with the aspirational operator (18

81. This amount was also consistent with our aspirationallmoral pilot amount of $6.33.
82. As mentioned, we cannot be sure of the degree to which an anchoring effect was present
under the mandatory norms because we cannot isolate the conscious motivation to avoid
punishment from the unconscious assimilation of the anchor.
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percent of subjects) than with the mandatory operator (7 percent of
subjects), and the difference in proportions was marginally significant
(Pearson X2 (1, N=141) = 3.5, p < .07, two-tailed).
V. FROM PSYCHOLOGY TO POLICY
In this final Section, we elaborate on the psychological aspects
of our findings, connect those findings to the essential functions of our
normative components, discuss the general implications of our results
for policymakers, and provide relevant, analogous real-world
scenarios.

A. Results and Psychology
To summarize the results from our study, our subjects
appeared to have some intrinsic motivation to give a portion of their
$10 allocation to an anonymous legal charity, and the norm
combination appeared either to leave this intact or to eradicate it.
The use of an aspirational operator ("you ought to give") left
subjects' basic intrinsic motivation intact. However, the level of giving
under the aspirational operator was essentially unchanged no matter
which norm-content was employed-an ambiguous moral standard or
any of the two clear bright-line rules. Thus, in this study, aspirational
operators could be used to tap into intrinsic charitable motivations,
but they did not successfully change those motivations by anchoring or
otherwise. It appears that once subjects were told that they ought to
give, they relied almost entirely on their own sense of how much they
ought to give. Exploring the contexts in which anchoring has a large
effect on legal decisionmaking (such as the sentencing study described
above) versus a small or no effect on legal decisionmaking (such as the
present study) is an important area for further research.
The use of a mandatory operator ("you are required to give
.")

and a sanctioning mechanism (". . . or you may be punished")

appeared to negate subjects' intrinsic motivation to give. This finding
is consistent with the psychological theory of crowding out-the
extrinsic motivation provided by a sanctioning mechanism crowds out
the intrinsic motivation provided by one's own moral sense. Notably,
using a mandatory operator led to a significant reduction in charitable
giving even with moral norm-content. That is, subjects failed to rely
on their own intrinsic moral standard simply because a mandatory
operator was used, and despite the fact that the precise content of the
mandate was to adopt a "strict moral standard"! Thus, in this study,
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the simple switch from an aspirational operator to a mandatory
operator paired with sanctioning eroded levels of charitable giving.
Yet, while the use of a mandatory operator and sanctioning
mechanism can be detrimental to charitable giving when paired with
certain norm-content, it can match or even outperform the use of an
aspirational operator. For instance, using $7 bright-line norm-content
and a mandatory operator performed no worse-and tended to
perform better-than an aspirational operator. And, although we
conducted all testing with a one-in-ten probability of sanctioning, we
presumed that rates of compliance under the mandatory condition
would increase along with an increase in the probability of
sanctioning.
B. Implications for Norm Function
Our findings provide insight into the functions of aspirational
norms and moral standards. Some authors have contended that
aspirational norms serve as information providers whose content
demarcates the specific line of supererogatory conduct. 83 Our results
challenge this description insofar as it implies that such norms
actually succeed in convincing subjects about the correct placement of
the line of supererogation. Specifically, once the decision was made in
our study to employ an aspirational norm, the subsequent choice of
what norm-content to include made little difference to the resultant
amount of charitable giving. In other words, there is no indication that
subjects accept this norm-content as a demarcation of the line of
supererogatory conduct.
From this perspective, it is fair to ask whether aspirational
norms have any effect on behavior. Had we provided our subjects with
$10 and used no normative language, would the mean level of giving
83. See, e.g., Gregory Scott Crespi, Redefining the FiduciaryDuties of CorporateDirectors in
Accordance with the Team Production Model of Corporate Governance, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV.
623, 640 (2002) ("As a practical matter, therefore, the existing fiduciary duty of care standard
provides directors only with an aspirational norm, an exhortatory statement of good practice,
rather than subjecting them to an enforceable legal duty."); Martin S. Flaherty, Rights, Reality,
and Utopia, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1789, 1791 (2003) ("By establishing both obligatory and
aspirational norms through recognized systems of consent, international human rights law
almost by definition marks the current 'limits of practicable political possibility' beyond which a
realistic utopia should extend its reach." (citation omitted)); Steven A. Hetcher, The Emergence of
Website Privacy Norms, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 97, 104 n.31 (2000) ("An
'aspirational norm' is the linguistic expression of a putative norm, that is, an expression
regarding a practice that the speaker would like to see come into existence."); Lewis Kornhauser,
The Path of the Law Today: A World Apart? An Essay on the Autonomy of the Law, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 747, 751 (1998) ("An aspirational legal norm characterizes the 'correct' or 'desired' behavior
while an operative legal norm characterizes the behavior to which legal sanctions will attach.").
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have matched the $6.05-to-$6.25 range observed in the three
aspirational norm conditions? Our data cannot answer this question,
and it remains an important topic for further study. However, we will
hazard some tentative predictions. Surely if we had handed out $10 to
law students without a word about giving to a pro bono charity, hardly
a cent would have ended up in the coffers of a legal services
organization. In our experiment, some form of contextual cue was
presumably necessary to activate an intrinsic motivation for charity.
Whether the specific use of aspirational language was necessary
remains untested.
The insignificance of our aspirational norm-content also
connects to an additional and unexpected finding: aspirational norms
appear to provide some insulation from anchoring effects. Of course
further study is necessary, 84 but our findings support the notion that
aspirational norms might be able to serve as a means of bringing
numerical values and directives to the fore without causing those
subject to them to become anchored.
Turning to moral standards, our results show that when a
subject's intrinsic charitable motivation is minimal-whether as a
result of crowding out or otherwise-moral norm-content (as opposed
to a bright-line norm-content) does little to prevent her from
exercising her selfish impulses. A persuasive explanation is that the
inherent vagueness of a standard renders it an ineffective check on an
individual's impulses, allowing her to exercise nearly unfettered and
(in this case) self-motivated discretion. Bright-line content, on the
other hand-and as designed here-appears to be an effective check or
short-circuit on the deliberation; it makes it more likely that an
individual will stop deliberating about what to give and will jump to
the conclusion that the imposed minimum is an appropriate division.
Indeed, it is interesting that the mandatory bright-line minimum
exhibited a symmetric influence on giving, making division at a level
both greater than and less than the minimum more infrequent than
under aspirational norms.

84. Further study might reveal why there is tension between our findings and those in
Englich and Mussweiler's sentencing study, for example. See Englich & Mussweiler, supra note
33, at 1547-49 (finding that anchoring has a "strong influence" on judges' sentencing decisions,
even when the judges are highly experienced, and the recommendation has little informative
value because it comes from a legal novice).
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C. Implicationsfor Legislation
What are the implications of these empirical results for the
design of effective norms? It is helpful to view the process of norm
enactment in sequence:
1. When considering whether to enact a mandatory norm to
regulate charitable behavior, first assess intrinsic
motivation.
2. If average charitable giving is already satisfactory, then
an aspirational rubric ought to be sufficient and could
be superior to a mandatory rubric.
3. If average charitable giving is not already satisfactory,
and the goal is to increase overall charitable behavior
above levels of intrinsic motivation, then a mandatory
norm ought to be employed.
As to the first step, our study shows that particular norm
species have unique relationships with intrinsic motivation when the
motivation in question is to make a charitable donation. Because
aspirational norms leave intrinsic motivation intact, while mandatory
norms minimize it, choosing the best norm species should be informed
by a determination of whether the currently present level of intrinsic
motivation is satisfactory. This determination helps when assessing
the strength of the group's social norms, an important inquiry when
deciding the degree to which more formal sanction mechanisms are
appropriate.85
Once that level is determined, the legislator must evaluate
whether more giving is desired. If an aspirational rubric is in place
and the present amount of giving is undesirable, it likely would not be
worthwhile for the legislator to tinker with the content of the
aspirational norm. 86 Our study indicated that the particular content,
whether moral or at a particular bright-line amount, did not bring
about statistically significant differences. Instead, under such
circumstances the legislator ought to consider adopting a mandatory
norm.
However, mandatory norms should not be enacted without
caution. If the level set for minimum giving is below that of intrinsic
motivation or if moral norm-content is employed, legislators risk
85. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 167 (1991) (discussing the prominence of informal norms and sanctions among the
close-knit group of Shasta County, California cattle ranchers, and stating "members of a closeknit group develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare
that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another" (emphasis omitted)).
86. Of course if the amount of giving is desirable, no further work is necessary.
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bringing about less charitable giving than would have resulted from
intrinsic motivation alone. Thus, minimums should be set
aggressively.
We recognize that setting high mandatory minimums presents
serious challenges to legislators. A legislature might face great
difficulty in enacting a norm that deems much of the prior conduct of
its constituency to be worthy of punishment. Enforcement
mechanisms under a mandatory rubric can be costly, and enacting
very high minimums can lead to high rates of noncompliance, making
enforcement more difficult and expensive.8 7 We leave it to legislators
to determine whether the benefits of increased giving outweigh these
costs.

D. Applications
We return finally to the scenarios where our findings are most
applicable: the ABA's regulation of pro bono work. In addition to the
facial similarity between our experimental norms and those employed
by the ABA, there are parallels between the background social norms
of our subjects and those of the members of the American bar. For one,
the majority of our subjects intend to become American lawyers. In
addition, within state bars and bar associations, lawyers often form
groups with a strong sense of collective identity, like our student
subjects here. And to a greater degree than in many other normative
systems (and due in part, no doubt, to the fact that they must pass an
ethics test in order to enter their profession), lawyers are aware of the
norms that govern their conduct, just as our subjects were keenly
aware of the norms governing them in our game.8 8
87. A vivid example comes from the setting of speed limits. A U.S. Department of
Transportation study concluded that, when speed limits were lowered, not only did
noncompliance increase, automobile accidents went up as well. See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T. OF TRANSP., REPORT NO. FHWA-RD-92-084, EFFECTS OF RAISING & LOWERING SPEED

LIMITS (1992), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/rdulsl-irrellindex.html (finding that "[1]owering
speed limits below the 50th percentile does not reduce accidents, but does significantly increase
driver violations of the speed limit").
88. Of course there are some differences as well. One difference between our experiment
and pro bono lawyering is that our subjects likely felt that they were parting with something
that they did not yet possess whereas lawyers might feel that providing pro bono service parts
them from their own precious free time. Studies have shown that people tend to have a bias
toward the status quo: they are less willing to part with something in their possession than to
give up the same thing if they have not yet possessed it. See Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment
Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1277, 1277-84
(1989) (finding that 89 percent of subjects given a mug would not later trade it for a chocolate bar
and that 90 percent of subjects given the chocolate bar would not later trade it for the mug).
While this is certainly a noteworthy qualification of our results, we hasten to add that we are
unaware of any reason why this bias would affect the relative performance of our variables in the
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At the outset, our results suggest that the ABA's enactment of
a different bright-line minimum under its aspirational rubric will not
likely lead to a significant improvement in overall giving. Indeed,
there are indications that the pro bono rate has not grown since the
aspirational fifty-hour minimum was adopted.89 Perhaps this is a
contributing factor to the current dissatisfaction with Model Rule 6.1.
Our results further indicate that enactment of a mandatory pro
bono regime can be expected to increase overall pro bono giving, but
only if the minimum approaches or exceeds current giving levels. In
2005, the ABA undertook an extensive survey of pro bono hours and
found that "[a]ttorneys surveyed, on average, reported providing
approximately 39 hours of free pro bono service to persons of limited
means or organizations serving the poor."90 Further, "46% of the
lawyers surveyed met the ABA's aspirational goal of providing at least

50 hours of free pro bono services." 9 1Assuming that these numbers are
accurate today, if the ABA changed Model Rule 6.1's operator from
aspirational to mandatory, the current fifty-hour bright-line minimum
could be sufficiently aggressive to increase the average amount of pro
bono service given. 92 For this bright-line minimum to be effective,
however, our results suggest that the ABA must install a sanction and
enforcement mechanism. Of course, our study is only a crude
approximation of the ABA rule, and further research is necessary.
The issues raised here also apply beyond the specific case of pro
bono regulation. For instance, contingency fee regulation has similarly
pro bono context. Furthermore, studies have shown that repeat players are less likely to exhibit
the bias, so it might not be a considerable issue for experienced lawyers. See John A. List,
Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA
615, 616 (2004) ("More recent field experimental evidence supports the notion that the
endowment effect can be attenuated with market experience." (citation omitted)). Moreover, it is
not clear that lawyers would conceptualize pro bono service as an out-of-pocket loss. For
example, many lawyers pursue pro bono work in lieu of billable work, meaning that it does not
alter their free time but rather their total annual billable hours. This might mean a smaller
bonus or a smaller total annual income at the end of the year for the lawyer, but under those
circumstances, pro bono service would seem more like giving up money not yet possessed than
giving up something of value already in the lawyer's possession.
89. See Christopher J. Piazzola, Ethical Versus Procedural Approaches to Civility: Why
Ethics 2000 Should Have Adopted a Civility Rule, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1197, 1231 (2003) (stating
that pro bono hours have fallen since Model Rule 6.1 was adopted in 1993, but noting that rates
for lawyers at large law firms have been steady and even increased in recent years).
90. AM. BAR ASS'N, SUPPORTING JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF AMERICA'S
LAWYERS 4 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/report.pdf.

91.

Id. at 5.

92. There are, of course, other choices. For example, Florida utilizes an aspirational pro
bono hour minimum, but it requires lawyers to report their pro bono hours publicly. See R.
REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-6.1. Presumably, this tactic is designed to maximize the positive
influence that social norms might exert upon charitable giving.
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divided legislators on the issue of the best norm combination. As with
pro bono work, legislators are concerned that lawyers will not consider
the pro-social implications of their negotiations with clients and will
take advantage of their superior bargaining leverage 93 to reap
potentially great rewards. The leverage imbalance can be the greatest
with the needy and unfortunate. In order to bring about more otherregarding behavior in setting those fees, the ABA and others have
considered imposing upper limits on the percentage that a lawyer can
take. The concern is not a new one; indeed, it is extant in legal ethics
codes since at least the 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar
Association, which took something of an aspirational/moral approach
to the issue. The Alabama code pithily stated, "[c]ontingent fees may
be contracted for; but they lead to many abuses, and certain
compensation is to be preferred." 94 Likewise, the 1908 Canons adopted
an aspirational/moral approach. 95 Significantly, nineteen states have
already set bright-line numerical limits, either flat dollar amounts or
percentages, on contingency fees in medical malpractice cases. 96 In an

93. There are concerns that the market has failed to drive contingency fees downward
because of widespread collusion among plaintiffs' attorneys. See Adam Liptak, In 13 States, a
United Push to Limit Fees of Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2003, at A10 (discussing criticism
that the market for contingency fees is not competitive and asserting that there is a uniform
contingency fee rate of 33 percent or 40 depending on the area).
94. CODE OF ETHICS OF THE ALA. STATE BAR AsS'N No. 51 (1887).
95. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, Canon 13 (1908) ("Contingent fees, where sanctioned by law,
should be under the supervision of the Court, in order that clients may be protected from unjust
charges.").
96. California (CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §52-251(c) (West 2005)), Delaware (18 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6865 (1999)), Florida
(FLA. CONST., art. I, § 26), Illinois (735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1114 (West 2003)), Indiana
(IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-18-1 (LexisNexis 2008)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2961
(2000)), Massachusetts (MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60(I) (West 2000)), Michigan (MICH.
CT. R. 8.121(b)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7.095 (LexisNexis 2008)), New Hampshire
(N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:8 (LexisNexis 2009)), New Jersey (N.J. CT. R.1:21-7), New York
(N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474-A (McKinney 2005)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7 (2001),
applying even outside of medical malpractice domain), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735 (2007),
punitive damages applying even outside of medical malpractice domain), Tennessee (TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-26-120 (2000)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78(B)-3-411 (2008)), Wisconsin (WIS. Sup. CT.
R. 20:1.5), and Wyoming (WYO. CONTINGENT FEES R. 5). In addition, federal law sets such limits
on contingency fees for several types of actions. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2678 (2006) (20 percent of settlements, 25 percent of judgments); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §
3730(d)(1) (2006) (between 15 percent and 25 percent); 38 U.S.C. 5904(d)(1) (2006) (veterans'
benefits, 20%); 42 U.S.C. § 406 (a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) (Social Security benefits, the lesser of 25
percent or $ 4,000); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1730 (2009) (Social Security disability, 25 percent cap); cf. 11
U.S.C. § 326 (2006) (setting maximum fee percentage for bankruptcy trustees based on amounts
turned over).
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even more progressive act, a handful of states have set numerical
limits on contingency fees generally.97
The ABA employs a mandatory/moral norm in its regulation of
all legal fees, however, including contingency fees. Specifically, it
forbids lawyers from "mak[ing] an agreement for, charg[ing], or
collect[ing] an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for
expenses." 98 It has come under fire for this approach, but on different

97. N.J. CT. R. 1:21-7 (setting maximum sliding scale for tort cases only); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 5, § 7 (2001) (capping contingency fees at 50 percent); R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 41.5(f)(4)(B)(i) (1993) (stating that charging more than sliding scale is presumptively excessive),
amended by Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 644 So. 2d 282, 305 (Fla. 1994), and
Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 658 So. 2d 930, 936 (Fla. 1995); 7 N.Y. JuR. 2d
Attorneys at Law 213 n.21 (1997) (noting that three of the four departments of the New York
Appellate Division have established rules setting scales for personal injury and wrongful death
cases). While the ABA currently does not set numerical limits on contingency fees, it
acknowledges the practice without criticism, stating in the Comment to ABA Rule 1.5 that
"applicable law may impose limitations on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage
allowable...." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 cmt. (2007).
98. Rulel.5 states, in part:
(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee
or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining
the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved,
and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent ....
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is
rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d)
or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client and
shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage
or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or
appeal; litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether
such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The
agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be
liable whether or not the client is the prevailing party. Upon conclusion of a
contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement
stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance
to the client and the method of its determination.
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is
contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support,
or property settlement in lieu thereof; or
(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
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grounds than we assert.99 The poor performance of mandatory/moral
norms in our test gives reason to doubt that the ABA's current
position is the most effective. Just as our study helps illuminate the
most effective pro bono regulation, further empirical data could aid
the ABA in choosing the optimal norm combination for regulating
contingency fees.
Our results hopefully can inform other regulating bodies as
well. One clue that a regulated domain is analogous to that in our
study is the degree to which norm combinations other than
mandatory/bright-line norms historically have been employed. Using
this as our measuring stick, international law emerges as a candidate.
There, "soft law" norms using aspirational operators or moral normcontent are used in greater proportion than in other domains,
including most domestic legal systems. 0 0 International legislators are
even willing to consider various norm combinations under
circumstances in which the stakes are very high, such as arms
control.' 0 Because of this willingness to consider different normative
approaches, norm choice is a hot topic of discussion in that domain.102

99. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers:
Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 653, 653-58 (2003) ("In theory,
these yields implicate ethical rules purporting to limit fees to 'reasonable' amounts. In fact,
'reasonable fee' rules are largely a shibboleth. The real role of ethical rules is to inhibit price
competition so that tort lawyers can continue to extract substantial rents.").
100. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional
Practice,61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 624-25 (2008) (discussing prevalence of soft law in international
law).
101. Jack M. Beard, The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: The Case
of the Biological Weapons Convention, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 271, 274-75 (2007) (citing Richard L.
Williamson Jr., Is InternationalLaw Relevant to Arms Control? Hard Law, Soft Law, and Nonlaw in MultilateralArms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 59, 63 n.14
(2003) (further arguing that "[1]ittle in arms control seems to depend on whether one thinks of
this category as a subset of soft law or just very mushy hard law"); Abram Chayes & Dinah
Shelton, MultilateralArms Control: Commentary, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra note
49, at 521, 526 ("Soft law can make an important contribution because it can more quickly
respond to changing weapons technologies that create uncertainty about the risks of the future
strategic situation and the mechanisms to minimize them."); Barry Kellman, Protection of
Nuclear Materials, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 49, at 486, 494-96 (arguing
that soft law makes a better framework than hard law for the regulation of nuclear materials
protection).
102. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 423 (2000) (arguing that soft law can be effective); Pieter van
Dijk, Normative Force and Effectiveness of InternationalNorms, 30 F.R.G. Y.B. INT'L L. 9, 20
(1987) (examining the relationship between norms and behavior, and considering normative
force and effectiveness in an international context); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the
InternationalLaw of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 420, 422 (1991) (finding "the general
sociological and juridical phenomenon termed 'soft' law" in the field of international
environmental law); Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based
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Understanding the psychology of norms can also be valuable to
private civic organizations. Civic organizations may likely draw
individuals with exceptionally high intrinsic charitable motives,
making mandatory norms particularly self-defeating. Moreover, such
groups tend to be small and aware of their norms, like the group in
our experiment.
Even in normative systems quite unlike the one employed in
our experiment, our results and similar behavioral research may
provide insight into the optimal regulation of charitable behavior. The
Dictator Game captures core features of numerous real-world
situations. As in that game, we can almost always give something of
value to another party that, no matter how deserving, lacks the power
to take the valuable item from our possession. 103 And in many
contexts, there are people with much more than they need and others
with much less. Legislators who recognize this inequality will often
seek to use their power to increase the giving of their subjects. Our
hope is that this research will enable them to do so in a more effective
manner.

Bargainingin the GATTI WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339, 340 (2002) (analyzing the degree and manner
of influence decision-making rules have in international organizations).
103. William Robert Nelson, Jr., IncorporatingFairness into Game Theory and Economics:
Comment, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1180, 1181-82 (2001) ("The dictator game has only been played
with small stakes in experimental settings, but it is constantly played with very high and very
very high stakes outside of the laboratory. Essentially, anyone with any wealth is playing the
dictatorship game at all times. There is always a person or cause willing to accept gifts. The
income range across the United States provides a range of natural dictator games varying from
very high to very very high stakes. The percentage of income given to charity is interpreted
similarly to the percentage offered in laboratory dictator games. High percentages given to
charity are interpreted as indicating that fairness has a large impact on behavior.").
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FIGURE 1-MEAN LEVELS OF GIVING:
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FIGURE 2: HISTOGRAMS
Donations by Experimental Condition:
Number of Donations at Each Possible Donation Amount
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Note: The bright line variable by which graphs are titled is
coded according to the amount to give, while the X axis is coded
according to the amount kept. Also, the two charts on the bottom are
for the norm combinations utilizing moral norm-content.
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APPENDIX II: Game Instructions
Please consider this information carefully before deciding
whether to participate in this research.
Purpose of the research:
To examine decision making in economic contexts.
What you will do in this research:
In this study, you will be offered the opportunity to allocate
several dollars between yourself and a charitable organization.
Time required:
Participation will take approximately 15 minutes.
Risks:
The risks that this experiment entails are anticipated to be
minimal.
Benefits:
At the end of the study, we will provide a thorough explanation
of the study and of our hypotheses. We will describe the potential
implications of the results of the study both if our hypotheses are
supported and if they are disconfirmed. If you wish we will send you a
copy of any manuscripts based on the research and a summary of our
results.
Compensation:
You will receive up to $10 in this study, depending on your
choice of allocation.
Confidentiality:
Your participation in this study will remain confidential, and
your identity will not be stored with your data. Your responses will be
assigned a code number, and will never be associated with any
personal identifying information.
Participation and withdrawal:
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary.
Participation in this study will not affect your performance in this
class or your relationship with the instructor. You may withdraw at
any time without penalty.
Contact:
If you have questions about this study, please contact:
Researcher:
Brian Sheppard
10 Charles River Terrace
Newton, IA 02461
bsheppard@law.harvard.edu
(617) 558-9743
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Sponsoring Faculty:
Daniel Coquillette
Harvard Law School-Areeda 130
1563 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
coquille@law.harvard.edu
(617) 496-3642
Whom to contact about your rights in this experiment:
Jane Calhoun, Harvard Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in
Research, Science Center 123, Cambridge, MA 02138. Phone: 617-4955459. Email: jcalhoun@fas.harvard.edu
Group A:
You have volunteered to take part in a simple experiment.
Please read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions,
please quietly raise your hand and you will be approached and
assisted by a monitor. If at any time you decide that you would not
like to take part or if you have already taken part in this particular
experiment, please leave your seat and approach a monitor.
During the session, you will participate in a game that gives
you the opportunity to earn money. Immediately upon completion of
the session, a monitor in another room will pay you your total game
earnings, in cash. Earnings are confidential: only you and the monitor
will know the amount of money that you make. The monitor will not
know your name, and your dealings with him or her will be on a oneon-one basis. Since your decision is private, we ask that you not tell
anyone your decision either during or after the experiment.
This experiment is being administered to current law students.
If you are not a current law student, please do not take part.
Are you a law student? Yes

No

While you may take part if you have merely heard about this
experiment from classmates, you are not allowed to participate if you
have discussed strategy or students' choices in the experiment.
Have you learned of this particular experiment from a
classmate? Yes_

No

If so, did you discuss strategy or choice? Yes
No
You have been allotted $10. You are asked to designate below
the number of whole dollars that you would like to keep. The
remainder will be given to an out-of-state charitable organization that
provides free or reduced fee legal services to the indigent.
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When you were granted admission to this law school, you were
given the privilege of receiving a superlative legal education and the
opportunity to become a public leader. These benefits, however, come
with the expectation that you will conduct yourself professionally in a
way that reflects a respect for justice, honesty, and fairness.
Accordingly, when you apportion this money between yourself
and the charitable organization, you ought to do so in compliance with
the strictest moral principles.
You will be paid in private the full amount that you decide to
keep immediately at the end of the experiment.
Please indicate the portion of the $10 that you apportion to
yourself (in whole dollars):
When you have finished, please fold this paper so that the text
on this page is not visible. Quietly approach the monitor at the front of
the class, who will direct you to the monitor in charge of providing
payment. In the event that there is a large group of students taking
part, further instructions concerning the payment location will be
written on the blackboard. Those instructions will correspond with the
letter below.
Group B:
You have volunteered to take part in a simple experiment.
Please read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions,
please quietly raise your hand and you will be approached and
assisted by a monitor. If at any time you decide that you would not
like to take part or if you have already taken part in this particular
experiment, please leave your seat and approach a monitor.
During the session, you will participate in a game that gives
you the opportunity to earn money. Immediately upon completion of
the session, a monitor in another room will pay you your total game
earnings, in cash. Earnings are confidential: only you and the monitor
will know the amount of money that you make. The monitor will not
know your name, and your dealings with him or her will be on a oneon-one basis. Since your decision is private, we ask that you not tell
anyone your decision either during or after the experiment.
This experiment is being administered to current law students.
If you are not a current law student, please do not take part.
Are you a law student? Yes-No
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While you may take part if you have merely heard about this
experiment from classmates, you are not allowed to participate if you
have discussed strategy or students' choices in the experiment.
Have you learned of this particular experiment from a
classmate? Yes_

No

If so, did you discuss strategy or choice? Yes

_

No

You have been allotted $10. You are asked to designate below
the number of whole dollars that you would like to keep. The
remainder will be given to an out-of-state charitable organization that
provides free or reduced fee legal services to the indigent.
When you apportion this money between yourself and the
charitable organization, you ought to give a minimum of $3 to the
charitable organization.
You will be paid in private the full amount that you decide to
keep immediately at the end of the experiment.
Please indicate the portion of the $10 that you apportion to
yourself (in whole dollars):
When you have finished, please fold this paper so that the text
on this page is not visible. Quietly approach the monitor at the front of
the class, who will direct you to the monitor in charge of providing
payment. In the event that there is a large group of students taking
part, further instructions concerning the payment location will be
written on the blackboard. Those instructions will correspond with the
letter below.
Group C:
You have volunteered to take part in a simple experiment.
Please read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions,
please quietly raise your hand and you will be approached and
assisted by a monitor. If at any time you decide that you would not
like to take part or if you have already taken part in this particular
experiment, please leave your seat and approach a monitor.
During the session, you will participate in a game that gives
you the opportunity to earn money. Immediately upon completion of
the session, a monitor in another room will pay you your total game
earnings, in cash. Earnings are confidential: only you and the monitor
will know the amount of money that you make. The monitor will not
know your name, and your dealings with him or her will be on a oneon-one basis. Since your decision is private, we ask that you not tell
anyone your decision either during or after the experiment.
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This experiment is being administered to current law students.
If you are not a current law student, please do not take part.
Are you a law student? Yes

No

_

While you may take part if you have merely heard about this
experiment from classmates, you are not allowed to participate if you
have discussed strategy or students' choices in the experiment.
Have you learned of this particular experiment from a
classmate? Yes

No

If so, did you discuss strategy or choice? Yes

No

You have been allotted $10. You are asked to designate below
the number of whole dollars that you would like to keep. The
remainder will be given to an out-of-state charitable organization that
provides free or reduced fee legal services to the indigent.
When you apportion this money between yourself and the
charitable organization, you ought to give a minimum of $7 to the
charitable organization.
You will be paid in private the full amount that you decide to
keep immediately at the end of the experiment.
Please indicate the portion of the $10 that you apportion to
yourself (in whole dollars):
When you have finished, please fold this paper so that the text
on this page is not visible. Quietly approach the monitor at the front of
the class, who will direct you to the monitor in charge of providing
payment. In the event that there is a large group of students taking
part, further instructions concerning the payment location will be
written on the blackboard. Those instructions will correspond with the
letter below.
Group D:
You have volunteered to take part in a simple experiment.
Please read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions,
please quietly raise your hand and you will be approached and
assisted by a monitor. If at any time you decide that you would not
like to take part or if you have already taken part in this particular
experiment, please leave your seat and approach a monitor.
During the session, you will participate in a game that gives
you the opportunity to earn money. Immediately upon completion of
the session, a monitor in another room will pay you your total game
earnings, in cash. Earnings are confidential: only you and the monitor
will know the amount of money that you make. The monitor will not
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know your name, and your dealings with him or her will be on a oneon-one basis. Since your decision is private, we ask that you not tell
anyone your decision either during or after the experiment.
This experiment is being administered to current law students.
If you are not a current law student, please do not take part.
Are you a law student? Yes

No

While you may take part if you have merely heard about this
experiment from classmates, you are not allowed to participate if you
have discussed strategy or students' choices in the experiment.
Have you learned of this particular experiment from a
classmate? Yes

No

If so, did you discuss strategy or choice? Yes

No

You have been allotted $10. You are asked to designate below
the number of whole dollars that you would like to keep. The
remainder will be given to an out-of-state charitable organization that
provides free or reduced fee legal services to the indigent.
When you were granted admission to this law school, you were
given the privilege of receiving a superlative legal education and the
opportunity to become a public leader. These benefits, however, come
with the expectation that you will conduct yourself professionally in a
way that reflects a respect for justice, honesty, and fairness.
Accordingly, when you apportion this money between yourself
and the charitable organization, you are required to do so in
compliance with the strictest moral principles.
A monitor in charge of providing payment will audit 1/10 of the
submissions to determine whether they comply with this condition. If
the audit results in a finding that a division does not comply, the
student that submitted the division will be told immediately in private
and will not be given any money. Otherwise, students will be paid the
full amount that they decide to keep immediately at the end of the
experiment.
Please indicate the portion of the $10 that you apportion to
yourself (in whole dollars):
When you have finished, please fold this paper so that the text
on this page is not visible. Quietly approach the monitor at the front of
the class, who will direct you to the monitor in charge of providing
payment. In the event that there is a large group of students taking
part, further instructions concerning the payment location will be
written on the blackboard. Those instructions will correspond with the
letter below.
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Group E:
You have volunteered to take part in a simple experiment.
Please read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions,
please quietly raise your hand and you will be approached and
assisted by a monitor. If at any time you decide that you would not
like to take part or if you have already taken part in this particular
experiment, please leave your seat and approach a monitor.
During the session, you will participate in a game that gives
you the opportunity to earn money. Immediately upon completion of
the session, a monitor in another room will pay you your total game
earnings, in cash. Earnings are confidential: only you and the monitor
will know the amount of money that you make. The monitor will not
know your name, and your dealings with him or her will be on a oneon-one basis. Since your decision is private, we ask that you not tell
anyone your decision either during or after the experiment.
This experiment is being administered to current law students.
If you are not a current law student, please do not take part.
Are you a law student? Yes

No

While you may take part if you have merely heard about this
experiment from classmates, you are not allowed to participate if you
have discussed strategy or students' choices in the experiment.
Have you learned of this particular experiment from a
classmate? Yes

No

If so, did you discuss strategy or choice? Yes

No

You have been allotted $10. You are asked to designate below
the number of whole dollars that you would like to keep. The
remainder will be given to an out-of-state charitable organization that
provides free or reduced fee legal services to the indigent.
When you apportion this money between yourself and the
charitable organization, you are required to give a minimum of $3 to
the charitable organization.
A monitor in charge of providing payment will audit 1/10 of the
submissions to determine whether they comply with this condition. If
the audit results in a finding that a division does not comply, the
student that submitted the division will be told immediately in private
and will not be given any money. Otherwise, students will be paid the
full amount that they decide to keep immediately at the end of the
experiment.
Please indicate the portion of the $10 that you apportion to
yourself (in whole dollars):
$

_______
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When you have finished, please fold this paper so that the text
on this page is not visible. Quietly approach the monitor at the front of
the class, who will direct you to the monitor in charge of providing
payment. In the event that there is a large group of students taking
part, further instructions concerning the payment location will be
written on the blackboard. Those instructions will correspond with the
letter below.
Group F:
You have volunteered to take part in a simple experiment.
Please read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions,
please quietly raise your hand and you will be approached and
assisted by a monitor. If at any time you decide that you would not
like to take part or if you have already taken part in this particular
experiment, please leave your seat and approach a monitor.
During the session, you will participate in a game that gives
you the opportunity to earn money. Immediately upon completion of
the session, a monitor in another room will pay you your total game
earnings, in cash. Earnings are confidential: only you and the monitor
will know the amount of money that you make. The monitor will not
know your name, and your dealings with him or her will be on a oneon-one basis. Since your decision is private, we ask that you not tell
anyone your decision either during or after the experiment.
This experiment is being administered to current law students.
If you are not a current law student, please do not take part.
Are you a law student? Yes

No

While you may take part if you have merely heard about this
experiment from classmates, you are not allowed to participate if you
have discussed strategy or students' choices in the experiment.
Have you learned of this particular experiment from a
classmate? Yes

No

If so, did you discuss strategy or choice? Yes

No

You have been allotted $10. You are asked to designate below
the number of whole dollars that you would like to keep. The
remainder will be given to an out-of-state charitable organization that
provides free or reduced fee legal services to the indigent.
When you apportion this money between yourself and the
charitable organization, you are required to give a minimum of $7 to
the charitable organization.
A monitor in charge of providing payment will audit 1/10 of the
submissions to determine whether they comply with this condition. If
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the audit results in a finding that a division does not comply, the
student that submitted the division will be told immediately in private
and will not be given any money. Otherwise, students will be paid the
full amount that they decide to keep immediately at the end of the
experiment.
Please indicate the portion of the $10 that you apportion to
yourself (in whole dollars):
When you have finished, please fold this paper so that the text
on this page is not visible. Quietly approach the monitor at the front of
the class, who will direct you to the monitor in charge of providing
payment. In the event that there is a large group of students taking
part, further instructions concerning the payment location will be
written on the blackboard. Those instructions will correspond with the
letter below.
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